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DOLLY, by and through his counsel
of record, respectfilly submits this Reply in opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff incorrectly states that Defendant Dolly "has no legal or
inherent rights to his excised tissue, and, therefore, no entitlement to
profits that have arisen from the research that Plaintiff has
conducted" (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Surem. J. at 981) and attempts to
convince this Court to disregard NuGenEra's violation of Dolly's
constitutional and inherent rights to privacy. Despite well-
established guidelines requiring that expressed and informed consent
be obtained from all individuals providing tissue samples, Plaintiff
not only disregarded established informed consent policies, but they
also try to convince this Court that such consent is unnecessary and
too burdensome, and that the Court should overlook or excuse
Plaintiff s misconduct in the interest of public good.
Plaintiff also focuses their argument on the issue of who has
ownership rights to excised tissue, and thus, rights to dispose of such
tissue. Defendant Dolly's ownership rights to his excised tissue and
right to control how his excised tissue is disposed is not at issue here.
There is no dispute in fact that Dolly's tissue sample contained his
genetic material and genetic information. What is at issue is one's
right to his genetic information and genetic privacy. Technological
advances now allow for the easy sequencing of Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) from a tissue sample. DNA is the highest level of
biological information available for each individual. A finding that
Plaintiff's U.S. Patent No. F6,635,271 ('271 patent) is valid is
equivalent to granting Plaintiff exclusive rights over not only Dolly's
genetic information as is presently known, but also exclusive rights
over future information on Dolly. As technology increases, the
amount of information that can be extracted from a DNA sample also
increases. Allowing any person or entity access or rights to this level
of information would be the gravest breach of every individual's a
priori right to control his or her own genetic information. Despite
this, Plaintiff urges this Court to not only find Claim 1 and Claim 2
valid, but also to ignore current public and policy goals that reflect
one's fundamental right to genetic privacy. For the reasons set forth
in Defendant Dolly's Points and Authorities and further herein,
Defendant Dolly has inherent ownership rights to his genetic
material. Furthermore, Defendant Dolly alone has the constitutional
and common law right to his own genetic material, including the
April 2002] 1035
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWRE VIEW [Vol. 35:1031
right to use it. Without having specifically relinquished any of these
rights, Defendant Dolly cannot infringe Plaintiffs '271 patent.
II. DEFENDANT DOLLY'S REPLY
A. Defendant Dolly Does Assert That He Has Legal and Inherent
Rights to His Excised Tissue
In the Introduction to Plaintiffs Points and Authorities, Plaintiff
incorrectly states that Defendant Dolly "has no legal or inherent
rights to his excised tissue and, therefore, no entitlement to profits
that have arisen from the research that Plaintiff has conducted."
(Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 981 (emphasis added).) This
statement is not supported by the record. In fact, Defendant Dolly
does assert that he alone has the inherent and all legal (i.e.,
constitutional and common law) rights to his tissue and all the
genetic material and genetic information contained in his tissues
(including excised tissues).
Only Defendant Dolly has the constitutional and common law
right to the use or sale of his own genetic material. Furthermore,
because Defendant Dolly has a property interest in his tissue
samples, he is constitutionally protected to profit from any
productive use of those samples. Enforcement of the '271 patent
would not only deny Dolly his fundamental right to disconnect his
body from the public domain (i.e., to control his genetic lineage and
reproduction), it would also violate Dolly's right to genetic privacy
and control over his own genetic information.
B. Defendant Dolly Retains All Ownership and Legal Rights to His
Genetic Material Including the Information for Which It Inherently
Encodes
Plaintiff asserts that "Dolly gave up the rights to the blood
sample when he gave the sample to AGTC. AGTC then transferred
the blood to NuGenEra, giving NuGenEra the blood and the right to
perform research on it." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 13.)
Defendant Dolly gave up none of his legal or inherent rights to the
genetic material and genetic information contained in his blood
sample when he entrusted his blood sample to AGTC for testing. As
stated clearly on the only consent form Dolly signed at the time of
blood sampling, the blood sample was for purposes of genetic testing
1036
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only and "all information will be confidential and will not be
disclosed by Advanced Genetic Testing staff." (Pl.'s Compl., App.
A.)'
1. Dolly gave up neither ownership fights nor any other rights by
entrusting a blood sample to AGTC for genetic testing
Plaintiff contends that it performed no wrong in obtaining a
sample of Salvador Dolly's blood and that Dolly gave up the right to
the blood sample when entrusting it to AGTC. Further, that AGTC's
subsequent transfer of the blood to NuGenEra transferred ownership
rights over the blood sample along with the right to perform genetic
research on it.
a. Plaintiff's purchase and subsequent use of the blood sample
amounts to clear and unambiguous misconduct
NuGenEra knew of the confidential relationship between AGTC
and Dolly. They were also aware of the health code regulations
regarding proper disposal of biological material. Their actions in
violation of both the confidentiality agreement between AGTC and
Dolly and section 7054.4 of the California Health and Safety Code
amounts to clear misconduct by NuGenEra. This is further reason
for why this Court should find Plaintiffs patent invalid and
unenforceable. To do otherwise would be to further reward
Plaintiff's misconduct and improper behavior in breach of Defendant
Dolly's inherent rights to his genetic material.
b. Dolly retained all rights to his genetic material as well as the
information contained in the DNA within the blood sample
Dolly's relationship with AGTC is clearly spelled out in the
consent form (see Pl.'s Compl., App. A), which Dolly signed at the
time he provided his blood sample. Nowhere in the agreement are
any of Dolly's rights assigned to AGTC or abandoned outright.
1. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Complaint referenced in Defendant Dolly's Reply. The Complaint also
contains Appendix A, which contains NuGenEra's Consent Form at issue in
this case. To obtain a copy of the Complaint and NuGenEra's Consent Form,
see The Program for Law and Technology at California Institute of
Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/
atc3/pleadings.html.
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Ownership rights must be affirmatively transferred. Since no such
transfer is evident in the record, Dolly retains all proprietary rights to
his blood sample and the information therein. Even if the physical
tissue sample is determined to be appropriately transferred to
NuGenEra, that does not extinguish Dolly's constitutionally
protected privacy rights, and therefore, control over the ultimate
disposition of his genetic material and the information contained in
that material. (See Def's Answer (discussing Defendant Dolly's
constitutional and common law rights to his genetic material and
genetic information).)
2
DNA is information. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 896-97
(Fed. Cir. 1988); BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF
THE CELL 99 (1983). As such, Dolly still has a constitutionally
protected right to the confidentiality of his genetic information
because transfer of his physical property (blood samples) does not
imply transfer of the rights to informational property contained
within the blood samples. The United States government, when
issuing and enforcing patent rights, becomes a "state actor" for
purposes of constitutional challenges. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948). Therefore, the government's disclosure of
Dolly's genetic information by issuing the '271 patent violates his
constitutionally protected right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment (right to confidentiality). See Doe v. City of New York,
15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
c. AGTC could not have transferred the right to perform research on
the blood sample because it did not have this right to begin with
The consent agreement specifies an explicit limited use, which
does not include the right to perform research. The consent
agreement clearly states the limited nature of AGTC's right to use
the blood sample: to "attempt to assess the likelihood that I [Dolly]
have inherited genes that increase the risks to my offspring of
developing several known genetically-based diseases." (Pl.'s
Compl., App. A) The consent agreement makes no reference to
2. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Answer referenced in Defendant Dolly's Reply. To obtain a copy of the
Answer, see The Program for Law and Technology at California Institute of
Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/
atc3/pleadings.html.
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scientific research, therefore restraining AGTC, and any subsequent
licensee, implied or otherwise, from asserting any rights to perform
such research. Informed consent must be secured. (See Expert Test.
Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)3 Therefore, it is impossible for AGTC to
transfer such rights to NuGenEra because AGTC's permitted use of
Dolly's blood sample was contractually limited to "testing" per the
consent agreement. (See Pl.'s Compl., App. A.)
2. AGTC failed in its fiduciary responsibility when it transferred the
blood sample to NuGenEra
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, AGTC did fail in its fiduciary
responsibility when it transferred Dolly's blood samples to
NuGenEra. The consent agreement clearly states an understanding
"that all information will be confidential and will not be disclosed."
(Pl.'s Compl., App. A.) By transferring tissue samples containing
Dolly's DNA to NuGenEra, AGTC knowingly violated the contract
between Dolly and AGTC. AGTC violated the inherent trusted
relationship and the fiduciary responsibility between a doctor and a
patient. Fiduciary responsibility requires informed consent.
The medical and research community recognizes their public
policy and ethical duties to an individual's inherent property and
privacy rights by requiring every patient's expressed consent prior to
any research, testing or use of the patient's tissue and/or DNA
samples. (See Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.; Def's Reply,
Ex. A, Parts 1 and 2.)4
It is standard practice in the medical and research industries to
secure explicit and informed consent before any medical or scientific
activities are performed on a patient or before using any bodily
3. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing the
Expert Testimony of Richard Myers referenced in Defendant Dolly's Reply.
To obtain a copy of Richard Myers' Expert Testimony, see The Program for
Law and Technology at California Institute of Technology & Loyola Law
School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
4. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing Exhibit
A referenced in Defendant Dolly's Reply. Part 1 of Exhibit A contains a
sample consent form. Part 2 of Exhibit A contains the University of Southern
California's Institutional Review Board (IRB) Application. To obtain a copy
of Exhibit A, Parts 1 and 2, see The Program for Law and Technology at
California Institute of Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at
http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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material provided by the patient. (See Expert Test. Richard M.
Myers, Ph.D.; Def.'s Reply, Ex. A, Part 1 and 2.) By failing to
secure appropriate informed consent to perform scientific research
and to commercialize the results thereof, AGTC and NuGenEra both
failed in their inherent fiduciary responsibility to Defendant Dolly.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990). Furthermore, this activity was a
breach of AGTC's contractual obligations to Dolly as it violated the
terms of the initial consent agreement between Dolly and AGTC.
3. Dolly's continuing interest in "excised cells" requires that the
cells within the blood sample be properly disposed subsequent to
performance of genetic tests
Plaintiff cites Moore to uphold their assertion that Dolly had a
limited continuing interest in excised cells. However, Plaintiffs
cited reference also outlines the requirement that such cells be
disposed of properly. Transfer to NuGenEra for the purposes of
research does not constitute proper disposal under any reading of
section 7054.4 of the California Health and Safety Code.
The California Health and Safety Code delineates that cells,
"following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by
interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state
department to protect the public health and safety." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 2001). Therefore, cells are in a
condition for disposal only "following conclusion of scientific use."
Id. The scientific use of Dolly's cells had not reached a conclusion
by the time that AGTC transferred Dolly's cells to NuGenEra. The
record does not support Plaintiffs contrary assertion in their
Statement of Facts. (See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Sutum. J. at 981-82.) In
fact, by Plaintiffs own admission, Dolly's blood cells were
transferred to NuGenEra for further research. (See Pl.'s Mem. Supp.
Suum. J. at 981-82.) Thus, Dolly's blood cells were still being used
for "scientific use" and were, therefore, not in condition for disposal.
Assuming arguendo, if the blood samples were in condition for
disposal, AGTC did not properly dispose of them by interment,
incineration, or any other method protecting the public health and
safety. See § 7054.4. Instead, AGTC transferred Dolly's blood cells
to NuGenEra in direct violation of the consent agreement.
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4. Granting ownership to Dolly will not impose any hardship to
medical research
Plaintiff claims that informed consent for transfer of such rights
as ownership would present a "colossal burden." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp.
Summ. J. at 983.) Respectfully, Defendant Dolly points out that
transfer of ownership without informed consent is commonly known
as theft and that limiting such activity is a burden only to those who
steal. Moreover, Plaintiff relies solely on Moore as its source of
referenced policy arguments. This is fatal because the policy behind
the decision in Moore is concerned with the extension of the
conversion theory of tort law. Here, Dolly is not alleging a claim for
conversion. Rather, he is asserting his constitutional rights to
property and privacy of his genetic material and information.
Accordingly, the Moore opinion is grounded in markedly different
polices and has little relevance to the instant case.
5. NuGenEra had reason to know of the impropriety of acquiring
Dolly's DNA
Plaintiff asserts that NuGenEra "had no reason to question the
valid ownership of the cells they obtained from AGTC." (Pl.'s Mem.
Supp. Sunum. J. at 984.) However, it is a matter of record that
NuGenEra did in fact know that AGTC entered into a confidential
relationship with the client as described in the consent agreement,
and therefore, did knowingly misappropriate the tissue sample in
contravention of that agreement. (See Pl.'s Compl., App. A at 5.)
Therefore, NuGenEra has no claim to any right to use or perform
tests on said sample or to use, copy, or distribute the information
contained in that sample. In fact, such misappropriation may be
subject to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 and, if so found, all
such information and any products derived therefrom, including the
'271 patent, would be forfeited. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839.
C. Even if Claim 1 and Claim 2 Are Valid, Dolly's Sale of His Own
Whole Blood Is Not an Infringing Act Because a Whole-Blood
Sample Does Not Satisfy the Statutory Subject Matter Requirement
for Patentability and Therefore Cannot Fall Within the Scope of the
Claimed Invention
Plaintiff asserts that the '271 patent satisfies the statutory subject
matter requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the issue is
ApIFril 2002] 1041
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whether Defendant Dolly's sale of his whole blood is an infringing
act under 35 U.S.C. § 271. A sample of whole blood is a product of
nature and as such cannot satisfy the statutory subject matter
requirement under § 101. Living things resulting from human
inventive effort are patentable subject matter if they are a product of
human ingenuity. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-
13 (1980). Indeed, we do not dispute Plaintiffs assertion that
isolated and purified DNA sequences are patentable subject matter.
However, whereas certain DNA sequences as compositions of matter
may qualify as patentable subject matter when in their isolated and
purified form, whole blood is not an isolated or purified genetic
composition. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to "make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential" to their
case as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for
granting of summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Furthermore, Claim 1 of Plaintiffs patent is directed to Dolly's
complete genomic sequence. While patent laws have been broadly
applied to biotechnology, a complete human genomic sequence is
widely regarded by both the scientific and legislative communities as
outside the range of patentable subject matter. (See Expert Test.
Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.) This is largely because there is no
specific, substantial or credible utility associated with the ownership
of the particular complete genetic combination unique to a given
individual. As expressed by Todd Dickinson during the Gene
Patents and Other Genomic Inventions Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property: "As with any
other invention, genomic products must be useful in order to obtain a
patent. Raw DNA sequence data, such as that recently generated by
the Human Genome project and by various corporate endeavors, is
not patentable as it stands. There is no utility associated with it."
Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Todd Dickinson,
under secretary of commerce for intellectual property and director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Department of
Commerce) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, whereas a given individual may carry interesting
gene variants requiring scientific and epidemiological verification (to
1042
DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION
establish a particular practical and credible utility), such gene variant
sequences may fall into patentable subject matter; however, an entire
human genome (which includes noncoding sequences), has only one
obvious utility-to generate a genetic clone of the source individual
(human cloning). We need not discuss further here, that human
cloning carries with it ethical, moral, and social policy issues. Not
only is the act itself prohibited in the United States,.but as a society,
we have deemed such activities unethical and abhorrent. (See Expert
Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.)
Plaintiff takes care to note that, in all three claims, the material
that is claimed is an isolated or manufactured composition of matter
that is not found in nature. We point out that while this is a
necessary condition for patentability, it is not sufficient grounds for
awarding a patent. Statutory requirements for patentability also
require that the invention have patentable utility, be nonobviousness,
and that the patent specification be enabling to one skilled in the art.
1. Only Claim 1 and Claim 2 are at issue here, both of which are
invalid for failure to meet long-established legal standards of
patentable utility
As asserted by Plaintiff, the utility of the invention of Claim 1
and Claim 2 is in its further use for advancing "research"--a use that
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-36 (1966), explicitly stated as
lacking patentable utility.
As Plaintiff notes, utility is defined as a requirement to benefit
society; patents are intended to motivate and award inventors for
doing public good. However, so as to protect against abuse of the
patent system by patent-seekers looking to preemptively exclude
others from a fruitful area of research, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) patent guidelines require a "specific,
substantial, and credible" utility. As Plaintiff asserts, Claim l's
utility is in "propagating conditions that permit further, advanced
research, rather than on a separate, 'immunity-boosting
mechanism,"' (PL.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 989), the goal of future
advanced research being to use the genome as a "valuable source of
anti-HIV compounds, which can be used to develop anti-EEIV drugs."
(Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 988.) In other words, Plaintiff
believes that there are genetic elements (other than the P sequence)
April 2002] 1043
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with anti-HIV properties within Defendant Dolly's genome, and thus
states the utility of Claim 1 as a research tool.
The Supreme Court explicitly states that "a patent is not a
hunting license." Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536. In adhering to this
standard, the new PTO biotechnology patent guidelines specifically
do not acknowledge the future use of the invention as a research tool
to be a patentable utility-it is expected to have some present utility
that will immediately begin to benefit society. Furthermore,
Plaintiff's stated utility for Claim 1 lacks credibility in that it has not
indicated how the genome will be used or what particular genetic
loci are candidate sites of interest. Essentially, Plaintiff wishes to
assert that § 101 be read so broadly as to allow the patenting of three
billion base-pairs of genetic sequence that have yet to be
characterized, annotated, and understood. This is akin to granting
exclusive patent rights for the identification of the letters used to
write a book containing three billion letters, but the order and
location of the words are scrambled and the meaning of ninety-nine
percent of the words is unknown. Only when the words and
sentences are unscrambled can the contents and substance of the
book be understood.
Finally, Claim 1 lacks specific utility because the asserted utility
applies to a whole category of genes (all the genes contained in
Dolly) and the intended uses have only been generally claimed. If
such a broad claim were to be allowed by United States patent law,
the result would be that Plaintiff would preemptively block future
research and innovation related to the anti-HIV properties of Dolly's
genome. As an illustration, it would be as if the inventor of a new
and useful fishing pole would not be entitled to a patent because a
patented utility exists (catching fish) that applies to an entire
category of inventions (nets, clubs, dynamite, etc.), as well as to the
catching of all unspecified fish. If Plaintiff were to be awarded such
a broad utility claim, ironically, the very purpose of patent law,
which is to promote research and innovation that would benefit
society, would be subverted, since the patent would only act as a
barrier to suppress further research by other scientists in this still
nascent field.
Similarly, Claim 2 lacks a credible and specific utility.
Plaintiff's stated utility for a "specific gene combination may also act
as a diagnostic tool for HIV susceptibility." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp.
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Suum. J. at 988.) This very language reveals that the claim lacks
credibility-Plaintiff has no evidence one way or the other whether
there is a substantial diagnostic utility for this gene combination, and
cannot claim as such. Like its suggestion of the use of the allelic
combination for gene therapy, these ideas lie in the domain of future
projections and predictions with no evidence that these utilities will
ever be realized.
Claim 2 also lacks a specific utility. Because Plaintiff has yet to
develop or pilot a diagnostic assay that makes use of the gene
combination P, the claim cannot be made that P can be used for this
particular purpose. Even if this were the case, the scope of Claim 2
should be narrowed to the use of these alleles for diagnostic
purposes. Because Plaintiff does not know the biological targets of
the ten alleles in Claim 2, it cannot begin to make a specific claim for
the use of these alleles. As such, its suggested utilities, for instance,
applications to gene therapy, diagnostics, or development of anti-
JIV pharmaceuticals, are unfounded and lie in the domain of
imagination. Furthermore, because these ten alleles are identified
from only a single individual (Dolly), even if Plaintiff asserts its
patentable utility to be in the potential use of these alleles as
diagnostic tools, for what or against whom can these alleles
diagnose? In other words, unless the variant or novel sequences of
Claim 2 are shown to also exist in other HIV resistant individuals,
how can they be used to diagnose or probe for alleles in anyone else
but Dolly himself'?
Clearly, substantial further research (e.g., epidemiological and
genetic linkage studies) will be required before the claimed P
sequences will be useful to anyone other than Dolly himself.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff wishes to control that research by claiming
exclusive ownership of the gene combination for which it currently
has no credible use. Again, the assignment of ownership fights of
the allelic combination to Plaintiff would serve only to hinder future
research and invention by other parties who could develop specific
and genuine utilities for the gene combination (e.g., use as a
diagnostic probe because the gene combinations do in fact exist in
other HIV resistant individuals).
There are no infringement charges on Claim 3, so its validity is
not directly relevant to this case. However, we simply wish to note
that because we consider Claim 1 to be invalid based on the
ApVril 2002] 1045
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:1031
discussion above, the stated utility of Claim 3-as a continuous
source of the Dolly Genome-is inappropriate because we consider
the whole Dolly Genome to be unpatentable subject matter. The
only credible utility of the cell line described in Claim 3 is as a
research tool; however, as also discussed above, utility as a research
tool does not merit patentability. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532-36.
2. Dolly's isolated blood does not fall within the scope of Claim 1
and Claim 2 and, as a product of nature, cannot fall within the
subject matter of Claim 1 and Claim 2
As repeatedly affirmed throughout Plaintiffs Points and
Authorities, the isolated genetic composition and the sequences of
nucleotides of Claim 1 and Claim 2 are not products of nature.
Therefore, a product of nature cannot infringe on the claims. Since
Defendant Dolly's blood is in fact a product of nature, the sale of
Dolly's blood cannot infringe on patent '271.
D. As a Matter of Public Policy, Plaintiff Should Not Be Rewarded
Nor Allowed to Profit from Research Derived from Unethical
Conduct and Misappropriated Tissue
Dolly's fundamental, constitutional, and common law rights to
his genetic property and privacy preclude any possible "right to
profit" claimed by NuGenEra when such profit arises from
misappropriation. Protecting these individual rights will aid, not
hinder "future research by removing necessary incentives for
companies to perform genetic research." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ.
J. at 996.) Plaintiff asks: "What company would expend limited
resources of time and money if it had no chance of profiting from its
labor?" (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 996.) This question is
irrelevant because it assumes that protecting individual rights equates
to loss of a company's possibility of profit from its labor. Rather,
contract law can easily secure economic profitability.
The real question is, what individual would delegate his body
and genetic material to research without assurances of his
constitutional rights to property and privacy? Answer: No one.
Indeed, this reality, more than any other, identifies a hindrance to
"future research" to a fatal degree. Standard practice in the field,
therefore, respects this right by requiring informed consent be
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obtained for all studies using human subjects. (See Def.'s Reply, Ex.
A. Part 2.)
1. Clear rights to one's own genome will aid, not hinder, further
research and commercialization
Plaintiff asserts that if individuals had clear rights to their own
genome, "[t]he obvious result would be a disaster to both ongoing
research and future research." (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 996.)
The facts do not bear out this dire warning of chaos and doom. In
fact, current practice among ethical practitioners presupposes the
patient's fight to control the use of his or her own body-including
the fight to control his or her DNA, as exemplified in the attached
consent form (see Def.'s Reply, Ex. A. Part 1) and discussed in Dr.
Myer's testimony (see Expert Test. Richard M. Myers, Ph.D.). In
fact, the record does not support the supposed damage caused by
acknowledging in this court the commonly understood rights of
patients.
In fact, Defendant Dolly believes that clear and unambiguous
rights will reduce the chaos and confusion in this rapidly emerging
field. Both companies and individuals need clear, bright lines to
delineate the rights and responsibilities of every party to medical and
biological research and testing in genetics. As our society progresses
from the industrial age into the information age-where even the
basic building blocks of life are studied, manipulated, and developed
as bits of information-a new regime of property rights must
emerge. Protecting the right of an individual to control his own
body-and the information that is uniquely his own-affirms
centuries of common law and constitutional rights in this brave new
world of modem technology.
2. Granting Plaintiff exclusive rights will stifle, not promote, further
research and commercialization
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion that exclusive rights for
Defendant Dolly will stifle research, it is clear that the converse is
true. Plaintiff has a noncredible claim to an astonishing trait-
resistance (HIV resistance) to what may fairly be described as the
worst medical crisis at the turn of the millennium. The global public,
and the pharmaceutical companies who provide medical cures and
treatments, will clearly benefit from a rapid and thorough
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investigation of Dolly's DNA. Instead, Plaintiff seeks a monopoly
on such research despite a failure to offer the public any specific
credible utility beyond use of the claimed invention for further
research upon itself. Indeed, Plaintiff has patented the entire genome
in the hopes of finding additional sequences that play a role in
Dolly's HIV resistance.
In the name of profit, Plaintiff seeks to create an "empty
sandbox" where they, and they alone, are allowed to explore the vast
potential of Dolly's DNA. This is unthinkable. Every researcher
with an interest, every lab with the motivation and the talent (and
Dolly's expressed consent), should be free to investigate and
discover unique applications of Dolly's DNA. When such
investigations lead to specific, credible applications of substantial
public benefit, then let us issue and acknowledge patents for drugs,
treatments, and compositions-for those inventions that can be
applied to real people in the real world. If Plaintiffs request for
recognition of its exclusive monopoly over Dolly's genome is
granted, the clear and unequivocal result will be the lessening of
research, a slowing of the pace of innovation, and a real and specific
loss of public benefit; indeed it could well lead to the continued
unnecessary suffering and death of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) sufferers for decades ahead.
3. Recognition and enforcement of Claim 1 denies research in other
areas of Dolly's genome that are completely unrelated to his HV
resistance
Plaintiff seeks exclusive rights over Dolly's entire genome,
including those sequences that do not confer HIV resistance but
instead are involved in other generic and heretofore unknown, but
required, biological life processes. Granting that exclusivity without
demonstrated specific utility will hinder further research and
development of benefit to our society, without providing any benefit
other than a privilege for those retaining the research rights. Such a
decision would restrict the investigation into the use of the 99.99% of
Dolly's genes whose functions are yet to be discovered. Clearly,
granting Plaintiffs request for a legal monopoly in Dolly's genome
would serve only to stifle research.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Dolly respectfully submits
that his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
Dated: October 19, 2001
Respectfully submitted,
Joe Andrieu
Lir Burke
Mimi H. Chiang, Ph.D.
Elizabeth Hong
LOYTECH LAW FIRM
Michael Wise
LYON & LYON
Catherine Polizzi
MORRISON & FOERSTER
Attorneys for Defendant,
Salvador Dolly
Exhibit A-15
Exhibit A-2 6
5. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing Exhibit
A-1, which contains a sample consent form. To obtain a copy of Exhibit A-i,
see The Program for Law and Technology at California Institute of
Technology & Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/
atc3/pleadings.html.
6. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review will not be publishing Exhibit
A-2, which contains the University of Southern California's Institutional
Review Board (IRB) Application. To obtain a copy of Exhibit A-2, see The
Program for Law and Technology at California Institute of Technology &
Loyola Law School Web site, at http://techlaw.lls.edu/atc3/pleadings.html.
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